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Since Wells has a long-standing practice of promoting temps into permanent positions, the workers had a strong incentive to perform well. His unit would review mortgage documents of borrowers who were described as “in foreclosure” which he understood in practice meant they were delinquent but the foreclosure has not not been initiated.
When our source arrived (spring 2012), they were in the process of doubling the work capacity of this effort.
A team of roughly 100 temps divided across two shifts would review borrower notes (the IOU) to see whether they met a set of requirements the bank set up.
Any that did not pass (and notes in securitized trusts were almost always failed) went to another unit in the same facility.
The bank changed procedures frequently, and did not go back to redo its prior work.
The whistleblower worked with a team of 50-60 temps, one of the two shifts involved in checking documents before and after the “corrections” were made.
Over the last two and a half years, Wells Fargo, like most of the major mortgage servicers, claimed that it had a “rigorous system” to insure that mortgage documents were accurate and complete.
The reason this mattered was that there was significant evidence to the contrary.
It’s not uncommon for a servicer or foreclosure mill to present “tah dah” documents that miraculously remedy the problems that homeowner attorneys have raised, sometimes resulting in clear proof of fabrication, like two different notes (borrower IOUs) having been presented to the court, each supposedly an original.
But what is striking about this practice is both the brazenness and the scale.